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Can informal economic activities be explained by social and 
institutional factors? A comparative analysis 
Abstract 
Empirical literature on informal activities often builds on macro-economic country estimates, which 
impedes testing behavioural hypotheses. The European Social Survey, documenting self-reported 
tax evasion in 26 countries, allows to test individual and institutional factors simultaneously. We 
model the effect of institutional and social capital factors affecting informal transactions. We 
predict that informality is fostered by social relations and trust, and curbed by institutional trust. 
Regulation and taxation fuel informal transactions, while effective enforcement inhibits them. 
These predictions are simultaneously tested with individual level data from the ESS, complemented 
with country level data on regulation, taxation levels and enforcement. Multilevel binary and 
multinomial logit, fixed-effect, MCMC and AGQ regressions confirm the predictions regarding 
social capital, trust and tax burden. Contrary to much prior research, we find weak and inconsistent 
effects of regulation and enforcement, which may also be due to the limited variation of our country 
sample. 
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1. Introduction 
From the evasion of fiscal or social security contributions over unlicensed sales to transgressions of 
zoning regulations, all are part of ‘the informal economy’. Throughout the different theoretical and 
disciplinary approaches of informal activities, a broad consensus emerges on a limited number of 
relevant causal factors. Nevertheless, research into the informal economy tends to ask one of two 
overlapping questions. The first one asks under what institutional conditions informal activities 
become more prevalent, usually by comparing countries. This question is often analysed with 
models introducing factors such as the control of private economic activity by the polity, taxes and 
the enforcing capacities of the state. The second one concentrates on individual and social 
properties. This question is answered with the help of factors such as agents’ perceived legitimacy 
of state control or their relations with others, trust in others and in the state. Although both 
questions are interrelated, most of the existing literature tends to focus on one of them. What all 
these studies have in common, is that they rarely adopt direct measures of behaviour: either they 
work with country-level estimates, or they make use of indirect proxies or indicators of informal 
activities (such as tax morale or the perception of other citizens’ deviant activities). 
 
This article contributes to this literature by testing theses from both traditions simultaneously with 
the help of survey data and multilevel methodology. We argue that informal economy studies are 
strongly influenced by the type of data used, and think that large-scale survey data, despite obvious 
difficulties, have some advantages that makes them the best candidate for theory testing. We are the 
first to make use of direct self-reported tax evasion data from a survey in 26 European countries. 
This allows us to test the explanatory power of a multilevel model combining country-level factors 
with social capital and trust variables. It shows that the sheer number of one’s social contacts and 
the generalized social trust one puts in other people have consistent positive effects on engagement 
in the informal sector. Concurrently, the more one assesses the state as legitimate, the less one is 
inclined to venture into informal transactions. Contrary to much of the prior research, the country-
level predictions come out relatively weak and inconsistent: tax burden seems to foster evasion, but 
this is much less true for regulatory burden and enforcement capacities.  
 
2. Accounting for informal economic exchanges 
We define informal exchanges as a subset of unrecorded economic activities. The latter refer to 
productive activities “that circumvent the costs and are excluded from the benefits and rights (...) of 
formal society” (Feige, 1990, p. 992). Informal exchanges distinguish themselves from other 
unrecorded activities by two constitutive elements: the transgression of some formal rule enforced 
by specialized agents and the marketed exchange. Notwithstanding this limitation, going informal 
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may still mean a lot of different things (Adriaenssens et al., 2015). Any exchange circumventing or 
transgressing some formal rule becomes informal. Therefore there are as many possible dimensions 
of informality as there are rules. This leads to an unmanageable and sheer infinite set of possible 
informal exchanges. Empirically this is unattainable, certainly when one aims for large-scale 
comparative survey data. Therefore, we limit ourselves to the measurement of just one form of 
informal exchange: the purchase of goods or services in exchange for cash with the explicit aim to 
evade payment of VAT or some other form of compulsory contribution. 
 
The general framework accounting for informal economic activities is that developed by Alejandro 
Portes (Portes, 1994; Portes and Haller, 2005; Portes, 2010, pp. 140-148). The model builds a three-
stage theoretical framework with the extent of regulation, enforcement by the polity and the social-
relational wiring of its citizens. The former two stages directly refer to the formal institutional 
functioning of the state; the latter has to do with how people relate to one another and to their 
government. We discuss these elements and point to the supporting evidence in the following 
paragraphs. It should be noted that Portes is neither the first nor the only student of informal 
activities pointing to these elements (e.g. Burroni et al., 2008, p. 487). His framework rests on 
broadly shared ideas about the functioning of the informal economy. We do not make use of Portes’ 
theory for its absolute novelty, but because of the generality, parsimony and testability of the model.  
 
In a first discussion, the boundaries of informal activities are defined. Any distinction between the 
formal and the informal sector becomes meaningless in a society without formal institutions that 
impose rules. Informality can only exist where state institutions have general formal rules defining 
what a legitimate economic activity is (or is not) (Lomnitz, 1988). This implies that the extent of 
regulation determines the possible scope of informal activities. All things being equal, this leads to 
the prediction that a more extensive regulation of the economy in a given society or country will 
bring forth more informal activities. Indeed, quite a few contributions support that both taxes and 
regulations push agents into informality (Loayza, 1996; Prado, 2011).  
 
From an empirical viewpoint, one often distinguishes between two types of state interference with 
the economy: those rules that regulate behaviour and those that allow to collect resources.  
On the one hand, governing elites wish to guard economic exchanges or other transactions so that 
phenomena or consequences defined as unwanted, immoral or unfavourable are monitored, 
forbidden, prevented or managed otherwise. Permits, labour laws, zoning regulations, 
environmental regulation, product standards or consumer protection norms, are all predominantly 
trying to bend certain types of behaviour or exchanges in a certain direction or prevent others. 
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These rules tend to limit the universe of actions on hand, or make certain transactions more costly. 
At the level of countries, the available evidence seems to support the thesis that the extent of 
regulation positively affects the informal sector (Schneider, 2005; Richardson, 2006; Kus, 2010). 
Loayza (2006) shows that product market regulation and labour market regulation have a positive 
and large effect on size of the informal sector. LaPorta and Schleifer (2014), on the other hand, 
argue that this effect may be smaller than usually expected for informal businesses. Their statement 
is based on the lack of weight informal entrepreneurs give to elements like business licensing and 
the legal system in in a list of perceived obstacles to business. 
 
Concurrently, governments collect resources in order to finance state functioning. In modern 
societies they do so with the help of taxes or similar contributions (e.g. social security 
contributions). In general taxation these rules do not expect agents to forgo or change certain 
actions, but they demand the transfer of financial means from the agent. Here too, there seems to be 
convincing firm-level (Wang, 2012), country-level (Giles and Johnson, 2002; Schneider, 2005) and 
regional evidence (Bühn, 2012) that higher taxes increase informal activities. Also, smuggling is 
motivated by tax and tariff evasion (Bühn and Eichler, 2009). As far as tax evasion goes, there is 
also evidence for an indirect reversed causal link, suggesting that corruption makes agents flee into 
the informal economy. This effect then reduces tax income and thus the mainstream measure of tax 
burden (Friedman et al., 2000; Bovi and Dell’Anno, 2010). Another indirect reversed effect would 
be that progressive taxation fuels tax morale (Doerrenberg and Peichl, 2011), probably leading to 
higher compliance rates. Loayza (2006), finally, found a negative effect of taxation on the informal 
sector. The effect disappeared after controlling for governance, however. 
 
As suggested by the Loayza’s contribution, the size of the informal sector is not just a linear 
outcome of the extent of regulation or taxation within a country. Our second prediction introduces 
the institutional factor of state strength, close to deterrence and penalty rates in the Allingham-
Sandmo model (Sandmo, 2005). When states are able to enforce their rules more or less effectively, 
the propensity to comply will be higher. This prediction is based on the assumption that citizens and 
firms calculate the profit from evasion against the deterrent of the penalty level and the risk of being 
caught. Higher odds of detection then make engagement in illicit behaviour less likely. Therefore, 
compliance to rules and taxes depends upon the state’s ability to enforce.  
There is also a possible cost of informality that is contingent on the public order enforcement of 
transactions by state authority. To withdraw from formal economic exchanges, implies that one 
forgoes the enforcing capacities of the state that help guarantee contractual obligations (compare 
North, 1986). In states with strong public order institutions, the enforcement of contracts happens at 
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lower transaction costs (compare Greif, 2005). More broadly, going formal may bring along other 
advantages: welfare state entitlements and benefits, consumer rights and product regulation. In 
short, state strength encourages compliance because subjects fear the punishment and because they 
count on the enforcement of rights through public order institutions. Existing research here is less 
abundant, but points in the same direction. For instance, a negative effect of the quality of 
regulation (Torgler and Schneider, 2007), of the quality of enforcement (Kus, 2010) and of 
institutional quality (Cummings et al., 2009) on the size of the informal sector have been 
documented. Loayza (2006) concludes that in high governance countries taxation levels even 
increase compliance, probably due to the increased attractiveness of the formal sector in this 
situation. This conclusion is in line with our prediction.  
 
The predictions regarding regulatory burden and state strength apply to the level of the nation-state. 
The following predictions refer to the effects of social capital.  
First of all, access to social relationships positively affects the propensity to engage in the informal 
economy. Social relations indeed represent the core of social capital, as it refers to “the ability of 
actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures” 
(Portes, 1998, p. 6). There is ample empirical support for the informational advantages of social 
relations, starting with early examples of the effect of social contacts on finding a job (Granovetter, 
1977). One can also interpret the literature on network positions of firms (Burt, 2007) as support for 
this thesis.  
Does this support also apply to informal transactions? Relationships as a resource imply that they 
can substitute public order institutions: the number and qualities of people’s social relations thus are 
supposed to foster informal activities. The mechanism behind this prediction is that informal 
transactions - much more than formal exchanges - depend on face-to-face relationships because of 
the higher general transaction costs of the former. Search costs for instance tend to be higher, as 
informal exchanges can hardly make use of formal media. In the absence of media such as yellow 
pages or advertisements, parties are dependent on friends, family and acquaintances. Only few 
studies tested this idea. Fortin (2007) looked for a mimicking mechanism of people in tax evasion 
experiments (but found none). Three studies bring in evidence in support of our prediction. Annen 
(2013) shows that the number of trusted social contacts have a positive effect on sales of informal 
garment producers in La Paz, Bolivia, and not on formal firms. Another survey of households in 
Belgium documents that social contacts with handymen or moonlighters affect the choice for 
informal outsourcing in home maintenance jobs (Adriaenssens and Hendrickx, 2009, p. 600). 
Lindström (2005), finally, found that the engagement in associations and personal networks 
increases the odds of consumption of smuggled liquor.  
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Next to the sheer quantity of social contacts, social trust as the qualitative or cultural dimension of 
social capital (Van Deth, 2003), is also expected to play a role. The underlying idea is that social 
trust, as do social relations, reduces transaction costs in informal exchanges. The lack of access to 
formal channels of contract enforcement (the police, courts) throws people back on mutual and if 
possible enforceable trust (Beckert and Wehinger, 2013). Greif (1993) developed this idea in his 
study of 11
th
 century Maghribi Jewish trade networks, where the lack of enforceability followed 
from the absence of long distance state institutions. In the case of contemporary informal 
transactions, the withdrawal from formal protection necessitates mutual trust to assure parties not to 
report each other to the police. This is illustrated by the historical case of the Jewish minority in 
Soviet Georgia, where the tight bonds enabled successful underground entrepreneurship (Portes and 
Haller, 2005, p. 408).  
In both cases trust in members of the in-group is crucial. This particularized social trust (sometimes 
called thick trust, see Gambetta, 1988) may have a different effect compared to generalized social 
trust (GST) , the trust one puts in other people regardless of whether they are in-group or out-group. 
Some research supports this. Lassen (2007) argues that GST mediates the effect of ethnic 
fractionalization on informal activities. Strong intercommunity bonds could thus go together with 
weaker GST (Delhey and Newton, 2005), as one can never be assured of the loyalty of ‘outsiders’. 
Evidence regarding the consumption of illegal liquor indicates that the combination of low GST 
with intensive social participation has a positive effect (Lindström, 2005).  
Nevertheless, existing research usually looks at GST, partly because this is the construct included in 
most large scale surveys. Contemporary evidence seems to result in contradictory outcomes. For 
instance, Sørensen’s (2011) analysis of a survey in Denmark finds that GST increases undeclared 
work morale, which is theorized as a proxy for the propensity to work officially. Hammar (2009) on 
the other hand, using perceived evasion by fellow citizens as a proxy for informal activities, 
concludes that there is a negative effect of GST on the level of informal activities. Both the 
construct and the respondents are close to Sørensen’s study, who finds contradictory effects, so it is 
difficult to conclude what the real effect is. Something similar happens with studies on country-
level measures. D’Hernoncourt (2012) finds that the national average of GST fosters the level of 
informal transactions in countries. Lee (2013) on the other hand, finds quite consistent negative 
effects of trust indicators and instruments on the national size of the informal sector. 
Existing evidence thus is inconclusive, to say the least. In line with the general expected effects of 
trust, however, we predict a positive effect of generalized social trust on informal transactions. 
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The final hypothesis refers to another type of trust, that is expected to have the inverse effect on 
informal transactions: institutional trust. In general, one expects that the perceived quality and 
legitimacy of the state’s interference with the economy will affect actors’ propensity to go informal. 
The theoretical frame called the ‘slippery-slope framework’ (Kirchler et al., 2008) introduces trust 
in authorities (a concept close to institutional trust) and power of authorities (close to enforcement) 
as interacting factors affecting tax compliance. There is considerable experimental support for the 
framework, in particular for the trust effect (Kogler et al., 2013; Kasper et al., 2015). A comparable 
effect of the relevance of institutional trust has been documented in survey on the purchase of 
illegal alcohol in Sweden (Lindström, 2008). Also, a number of characteristics are consistent with 
lower levels of tax evasion or a stronger propensity to comply: identification of respondents with 
their state (Konrad and Qari, 2012), respondents who report higher public good benefits (Alm and 
Gomez, 2008), who have more trust in democracy (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010) or in the 
political system (Mariën and Hooghe, 2011). All in all, there thus seems to be quite strong support 
for our predictions regarding institutional trust. 
 
In short, six predictions have been made regarding engagement in the informal economy. These 
predictions are summarized in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
In the remainder of this section, we focus on the methodological approach of existing studies. We 
argue that in contributions dealing with informal activities or tax evasion, there is a general lack of 
studies making use of direct measures of behaviour, and of designs that are able to combine 
institutional with individual-level factors. The empirical literature is dominated by three 
approaches, built on different types of data and designs: country-level macro-economic models, 
experimental approaches and survey measures.  
 
First of all, many economic contributions seem to favour macro-economic estimates, starting with 
Guttman’s (1977) ground-breaking contribution. His indirect technique estimates the overall 
informal production with the help of readily available data. This approach still is the dominant one, 
though the methodology has progressed significantly since the 1970’s (Caridi and Passerini, 2001; 
Ahumada, 2007).  
Empirical studies in this area are exemplified by the influential papers of Friedman e.a. (2000) and 
of Loayza (1996). What these contributions have in common, is that they model the influence of 
institutional factors (taxes, quality of governance, enforcement) on the informal sector in a sample 
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of countries. There is little doubt that this approach is successful. One important limitation, 
however, is that macro-economic models build on country-level data. These data are able to model 
aggregate factors well, but are a poor starting point to test micro-economic, behavioural or 
sociological factors of informality. Some papers do attempt to deal with individual-level effects on 
informal activities, in particular when social trust is discussed (e.g. D’Hernoncourt and Méon, 2012; 
Wang, 2012). In short, macro-economic approaches sometimes include individual or small group 
features by aggregating data. The risk of this strategy is that it may yield ecologically fallacious 
results.  
 
Experiments, also in research on tax compliance, represent a strong research programme (as argued 
in Alm et al., 2015). However, problems regarding external validity are an issue. One element that 
may pose problems, is that tax compliance experiments often construct a tax context that does not 
exist in real life, at least not for the participants. For instance, Kogler e.a. (2013) ask subjects to 
imagine that they live in a fictitious country, where features are manipulated according to the 
condition. There is little doubt that this mind game differs from really living under a certain type of 
government. At the very least, experimental data are in need of some sort of robustness check of 
triangulation with the help of other data sources or research designs (as argued in Cummings and 
Martinez-Vazquez and McKee and Torgler, 2009). Survey data are a privileged candidate to 
provide this check. 
 
The third data source and design often adopted, indeed is that of surveys. While surveys usually are 
collected in one or a limited number of policy units (countries, regions), they have the definite 
advantage that they provide individual level-data from the real world. We argue that survey data 
about compliance behaviour, provided they are reasonably reliable, promise to remedy some of the 
problems that macro-economic and experimental data pose. Still, the “unhealthy scepticism on the 
part of many economists” (Thomas, 1990, p. 623) regarding surveys hardly changed 25 years after 
Thomas’ apt observation. For instance, Slemrod and Weber (2012, pp. 32-33) need just a few words 
to relegate surveys as a means to study the informal economy.  
The problem, however, is that the existing survey based literature on informal activities often fails 
to exploit the possible advantage of measuring behaviour directly. Most contributions 
predominantly make use of indirect proxies of informal activities. Some, for instance, use the 
perceived evasion by fellow citizens (as in Hammar and Jagers and Nordblom, 2009; Wang, 2012). 
Even more often, the so-called ‘tax morale’ is introduced as a proxy of tax evasion (most often tax 
morale is measured with a Likert scale asking people whether cheating on taxes is justified, as in 
Alm and Gomez, 2008; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010). This approach may be problematic. 
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Consistent evidence shows that tax morale affects tax compliance (Alm and Torgler, 2011; Halla, 
2012), but at the same time the relationship is moderated by a number of other factors. This is 
consistent with results from the norm activation theory, showing that a moral norm is quite 
successful in explaining low-cost behaviour such as voting, but has far less power in high-cost 
situations (Steg and Vlek, 2009). The construct of tax morale thus cannot be equated to actual non-
compliance. 
 
In sum, all three designs have their strengths and weaknesses. Macro-economic estimates allow for 
modelling of country-level variables, but may pose aggregation problems when extended to 
individual or group features. Experiments are promising, but are in constant need of some external 
validation through concurrent estimation with alternative designs based on real-life data. Survey 
research has the advantage of direct measures of behaviour, but often fails to exploit this potential 
strength by using proxies of informal activity. Also, most survey data do not cover enough political 
units to assess country-level variables. In the next section, we argue how our design attempts to 
exploit the promises of surveys, and to overcome the weaknesses. 
 
3. Data and estimation strategy 
We argue that multi-country survey data allow to combine the advantages of macro-economic 
research with those of mainstream survey research. The core contribution of this article indeed is 
that micro-economic predictions are combined with institutional estimations. Our data measure a 
direct self-reported measure of tax evasion in multiple countries. The comparative advantage lies in 
(1) its direct measurement of behaviour, and (2) its potential to estimate institutional and individual 
predictions simultaneously without aggregation problems. The first element allows for the evasion 
of the use of proxies who, as argued in the previous section, often assume a leap of unsubstantiated 
faith in the connection between the proxy and actual informal activities. The second element has the 
advantage that no aggregation of individual data are needed, but that the simultaneous estimation of 
country-level and individual factors remains possible.  
These potential advantages of survey based behavioural measures do not imply that their 
measurement would be straightforward or unproblematic. Due to the concealed and illegal nature of 
informal exchanges, the possible bias is significant. Therefore, after elaborating on the reasons to 
make use of comparative survey data, we will assess the quality of our measure in the first section. 
The second section then explains the estimates in the model. In the final section, we go into the 
estimation strategy,  
 
3.1 A survey measure of informal exchange 
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Measuring what is hidden is a formidable challenge. In fact, the easiest and deadliest critique of any 
contribution studying informal activities is to ask the methods question: what about validity and 
reliability? In the light of the social-scientific and political relevance of the issue, however, one 
should not stop attempting to collect evidence and analyse them to reduce uncertainty. We singled 
out that the existing approaches all have limitations that call for the use of direct measures of 
informal activities. Because individual measures of informal activities are necessary to make the 
theory testable, survey measures remain the best route available.  
 
We thus use a direct measure of informal activities through self-reported cash payments in order to 
avoid taxes. The dataset is the second round of the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2005 in 26 
European countries. Apart from its high standard in data collection, and the availability of well 
measured background variables, the main reason to choose for this dataset is that it contains an item 
measuring people’s engagement in the informal economy, worded as follows:  
“How often, if ever, have you done each of these things in the last five years?  
How often, if ever, have you paid cash with no receipt so as to avoid paying VAT or other 
taxes?” 
Respondents chose from a five point scale ranging from ‘never’ to ‘5 times or more’, with 
interviewer coding of ‘no experience’, ‘refused’ or ‘don’t know’. The former was coded in the same 
category as those who reported not to have evaded taxes, the latter two as a non-response. The core 
of the analysis will centre around this self-reported payment in cash in order to evade taxes.  
 
The results of the item on self-reported informal transactions lead to a strongly right skewed 
distribution (figure 1). Overall 24.3% of the respondents admitted tax evasion at least once. 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Does this direct approach give sufficient guarantees for a reliable and valid measurement? One way 
of assessing the quality of the measure is predictive validation. We compare the measure with a 
later estimate of informal activities in the Eurobarometer survey (European Commission, 2007), 
both aggregated at the national level. The proportion of respondents reporting at least one informal 
exchange in the past five years (at country level) correlates reasonably well with the Eurobarometer 
proportion of respondents admitting to have purchased informal goods or services in the past year 
(R=0.45, n=21, p=0.04). 
It is possible, however, that the both surveys suffer from a common bias, e.g. if surveys as a whole 
were flawed as a method. Comparing the survey results with macro-economic estimates of informal 
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activities (notwithstanding the criticisms against this approach, e.g. in Thomas, 1992) might shed 
light on this hypothetical common method bias. It comes as quite a surprise that the correlation 
between the ESS results and a macro-economic estimate of the proportion of informal added value 
in the GDP for the same year (based on Schneider et al., 2010) is negative, though only borderline 
significant (R=-0.29, n=26, p=0.155). At closer inspection, the most consistent difference seems to 
exist in countries that democratized in the final decades of the 20
th
 century, as opposed to countries 
who became democracies before the 1950’s. Those recent democracies consist of southern countries 
(Turkey, Spain, Portugal and Greece) and former communist central-European regimes (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine). Here the overall correlation 
is negative, while this is not the case for the remaining countries. The literature provides some 
support for this finding. It has been argued that the communist history may have caused a stronger 
social desirability bias in surveys for items relating to noncompliance and the government 
(Gërxhani, 2007, p. 561). To be clear: this is a methods effect, creating a bias of the real behaviour 
of respondents due to a special case of social desirability bias. 
 
In sum, the evidence suggests that there is more underreporting of self-reported informal exchanges 
in Southern and Central European countries, compared to Western Europe. This is a methodological 
problem, that may also cloud our understanding of inter-country differences. This is not the final 
say in this matter. For the purposes of testing our predictions, we need some reassurance of cross-
country equivalence. 
First of all, a fixed effects regression will be one of the estimations. This allows us to assess the 
individual level variables under control of unobserved differences between countries, also the 
possible path dependent social desirability bias. Because of this, it is not advisable to interpret the 
country dummy parameters. We do use them to control for possible inter-country bias. Second, 
observations in the multilevel analysis can vary across countries due to the random intercepts. This 
takes possible inter-country non-equivalence into account. Finally, as a robustness check, the same 
regressions have been estimated on the subsample of 15 countries that seem to correlate better to 
other estimates of the informal economy.  
 
3.2 The causal factors 
We distinguish between direct regulations (imposing a certain behaviour on companies and 
individuals) on the one hand, and taxes. For direct regulation we use the composite indicator 
‘degree of regulation’ measured by Kus (2010), building on the ‘Doing Business’ dataset (World 
Bank and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2012). The indicator is the 
arithmetic mean of the z-scores of 12 indicators, three from each of the following dimensions: 
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market entry, paying taxes, employment of workers and property registration. We calculate the 
indicator from the 2005 data. Taxation is measured for the year 2005 with the simplest and most 
straightforward measure: the ratio of tax revenues of each country (OECD, 2011). 
 
As for state strength, we follow Kus (2010) in the choice for the World Bank composite indicator of 
‘rule of law’, measuring “the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2009, p. 6). This captures 
both aspects of enforcement pretty well. A possible problem of the measures of state strength is that 
the sample of countries shows fairly little variation. The ‘rule of law’ composite indicator is built as 
a z-score, so it has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1 (n=212). For our sample of 26 
countries the mean is +1.21, and the standard deviation 0.69. This confirms that the sampled 
countries perform relatively well. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The individual level factors of social relations, social and institutional trust are taken from the 
original ESS dataset
1
. For the latter two a composite indicator is constructed with acceptable 
internal consistency (Table 2). As noted earlier, the measurement of GST is based on three items (a 
methodological assessment in Reeskens and Hooghe, 2008). 
Finally a limited set of control variables are introduced in the regression models. Gender, age, 
education and economic status have an influence on people’s informal engagement (in particular 
Lim, 2002; Feld and Larsen, 2005; Gorisov, 2005; Adriaenssens and Hendrickx, 2009; Williams, 
2009). We are not concerned with the rationale of these relationships here, but merely control for 
biased estimations.  
 
3.3 Estimation strategy 
According to our predictions, individual decisions regarding informal activities are clustered in an 
institutional level of the nation state. The thesis expects that characteristics of both levels influence 
informal exchange. This logic is close to the logic of multilevel modelling or ‘hierarchical linear 
modelling’. This approach started with the growing awareness that associations at one level of 
aggregation are not necessarily evidence for associations at different aggregation levels (de Leeuw 
and Meijer, 2008). The basic idea is that one can study the simultaneous effects of problems (and 
data) of more than one level. In our case, the multilevel problem refers to two units: individual 
respondents are nested in countries, and are therefore subjected to its policy, taxation and rule 
enforcement. 
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Two options are available to take the influence of national characteristics together with factors at 
the individual level into account. The simplest procedure is to estimate a fixed effects (logistic) 
regression, with the countries as dummies in the model. In that case one controls for all country 
characteristics, both observable and non-observed. The obvious advantage thus is that this approach 
also controls for country-level features that are unobserved or difficult to measure. Because of the 
advantages of this approach, we first estimate an ordinary binary logistic regression with fixed 
effects with the individual level hypotheses, the control variables and country dummies
2
. The 
downside, however, is that it does not allow for the inclusion of characteristics at the national level.  
 
The alternative is to work with multilevel methods. In that case one also includes variables at the 
higher level, in this case countries. Multilevel methods take into account that lower level 
characteristics are nested in higher level units. Our predictions include national features, so that the 
second option is the more complete one. Therefore, the second model tested is a multilevel estimate 
with the introduction of the complete model
3
. Marginal (MQL) and penalized (PQL) quasi-
likelihood methods have been criticised because the estimates may be biased (Browne and Draper, 
2006). Therefore, in our base model, we choose for a Bayesian MCMC simulation: it reduces the 
bias inherent in alternative functions and it is a computationally efficient solution for estimating 
complex models (Rodriguez, 2008, p. 355).  
 
More in detail, for the second model the following random intercepts model was estimated: 
Yij ~ Bernoulli(πij) with 
log((πij)/(1−πij)) = β0j + β1a x1aj + β1b x1bj + β2 x2j + β3 x3ij + β4 x4ij + β5 x5ij + β control variables 
β0j = β0 + u0j , 
where Yij is the binary indicator of informal activities and u0j ~ N(0, σu²). The variables x1a, x1b and 
x2 denote the country level variables regulation, tax burden and rule of law as described in section 
3.2. The variables x3, x4 and x5 are the individual level variables social relations, social trust and 
institutional trust. The control variables age, gender, professional status, and educational level are 
all reflected in the final term.  
 
In order to check the robustness of these results, a number of alternative specifications are modeled.  
First of all some alternative estimation methods are used for the first model. Notwithstanding the 
potential bias of Penalized Quasi Likelihood techniques, mainly with small cluster sizes, this 
technique was estimated too. A superior technique, often presented as an alternative to MCMC, are 
adaptive Gaussian quadrature methods (AGQ) as developed in the GLLAMM routines (Rabe-
Hesketh et al., 2005)
4
. The AGQ method is arguably an improvement in comparison to Gauss–
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Hermite quadrature (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2002). In short, the model estimated in the base model 
with fixed-effects and MCMC, is reproduced with PQL and AGQ in the robustness checks (model 
1, continued). The AGQ works with 24 quadrature points. 
 
Next, we test an alternative technique: an ordered multinomial logit model. The initial model 1 
specifications all start from a binary logistic model: these analyses are based on a dichotomization 
between respondents reporting at least one incidence of tax evasion, and those who did not. This is 
a reduction: the survey data originally measured the respondents answer in five categories. This 
original measure is used to model the same estimates (fixed-effects, PQL-2, GLLAMM and 
MCMC) with an ordinal logistic regression.  
 
Hitherto all mixed models included all the observations available in 26 countries. In section 3.1 we 
showed indications of a difference in bias in a number of Central and Southern European countries. 
We exclude these countries from our analysis in model 3, presenting a series of estimations on a 
subsample of 15 Western European countries.  
 
All estimates in models 1 to 3 have only random intercepts. The fourth model introduces random 
slopes for x3, x4 and x5. Because of the rather extreme complexity of the model, we only estimate 
the computationally more efficient MCMC regressions.  
 
Finally, alternative country data are used in the final regressions. We look for indicators that are 
more directly concerned with evasion of indirect taxes such as VAT (see table 2, variables 1a’, 1b’ 
and 2’).  
 
5. Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the fixed effects logistic regression and logistic regression with 
random intercepts, both in binary logistic and ordinal function. As argued earlier, we prioritize the 
first two estimates of model 1. The fixed effects model allows us to estimate the individual level 
factors well. The MCMC model also allows us to test whether the country characteristics, stated in 
our hypotheses, are accountable for the country differences.  
From the hypotheses at the country level, the tax burden (hypothesis 1.b) survives the multilevel 
regression, but barely. The surprising fact is that neither regulation nor enforcement influences 
informal transactions according to our estimates. A possible methodological (and substantial) 
explanation for this result may be that the sample of countries does not show a lot of variance with 
respect to the indicators, as shown in the methods section (section 3.2).  
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TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Overall the individual level results, both in the fixed-effects and multilevel regressions, are equally 
strong. This gives support to the idea, defended in the methods section, that both approaches are 
able to estimate the relevance of individual level factors fairly well.  
All three individual level hypotheses are in line with the evidence. The number of social relations 
has a significant positive effect on the probability that a person goes informal, just as social trust. 
Social capital therefore has a surprising yet consistent effect on this type of deviant activities. 
Frequent social contacts and higher trust in other people positively contribute to the access to 
informal transactions. 
As hypothesized, subjects’ trust in official institutions and agents of the state has the opposite 
effect. Indeed, there is a quite strong negative effect of institutional trust on the possibility people 
engage in informal transactions. This leaves us with the empirically validated conclusion that 
institutional trust directly bears upon the propensity to exchange on the black market. 
 
The robustness checks (the latter two estimates of model 1 and 2) broadly confirm these results. A 
higher tax burden consistently increases tax evasion. Regulation and enforcement virtually never 
bear upon informality. The estimates on the subsample of Western European countries, have one 
surprising result. Regulation does seem to affect informality; tax burden also has a stronger effect 
on informality here. The opposite holds for the social trust factor, which becomes non-significant in 
the subsample. This implies that the inclusion of Southern and Central European countries account 
for the effect of social trust. 
For the rest, the social relations and trust factors have stable effects throughout the specifications. 
However, the effect of the social capital and trust variables seems to become somehow weaker (but 
remains significant) in the random slopes model. This probably is due to an increase in the standard 
error, as the analysis no longer estimates one common slope, but the average of varying slopes. 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
This contribution may be the start of a more intense use of multi-country survey data to account for 
informal transactions and tax evasion. The model chosen, based on Alejandro Portes’ discussions, is 
founded on its parsimony and its combined use of existing institutionalist and social capital causal 
factors explaining engagement in the informal sector. We predict that three groups of causal factors 
are relevant: (1) the extent of regulation and enforcement in countries, (2) the trust people put in 
their government, and (3) the social wiring between people, usually denoted as ‘social capital’. The 
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contribution of this paper is that it is the first to test these predictions simultaneously with the help 
of a multi-country large scale dataset that captures informal activities directly. It provides broad 
support, in particular for the second and third predictions.  
 
A number of arguments plead for the use of survey data to test this model. Most of all, the 
increasing availability of multi-country comparative survey data of high quality, makes a 
simultaneous estimation of institutional and social capital and trust factors attainable. The most 
important argument is thus that comparative survey data allow for a falsification of micro-economic 
theories, while typical macro-economic methods confine themselves to an estimate of informality at 
the level of policy and macro-economic characteristics. Taken together a multilevel model 
simultaneously testing social capital and trust variables and institutional variables is within reach. 
That is exactly where this article make a contribution. At the same time the contribution pleas for 
direct measures of behaviour instead of proxies such as tax morale. While people’s moral or 
normative justification of tax cheating is a legitimate object of research, its relation with actual 
behaviour is not straightforward, as indicated by research of the effect of moral norms.  
 
Notwithstanding these arguments, one must take care to select reliable data. There are strong 
indications that social desirability bias affects data unevenly. Comparison of the ESS data with 
other estimates of the informal sector indicates that the problem is most pressing in countries that 
democratized in the final decades of the 20
th
 century. A significant proportion of the respondents 
grew up under totalitarian surveillance, which may influence enduringly their response style and 
increase social desirability bias. We therefore ran a robustness check by estimating the model on a 
subsample of fifteen countries. Second, the available data only report about one type of informal 
exchanges, while in the best of worlds, a survey would assess more than one type of informal 
transactions. 
 
The regressions indicate that a higher tax burden tends to strengthen the informal sector. This result 
adds up to an existing body of evidence, although some studies found different results. The effect is 
quite weak, however. The tax burden effect becomes stronger in the analysis of the subset of 
Western European countries. Also, regulatory burden may have some effect on informality too, in 
this limited sample. These results suggest that the path dependent differences in social desirability 
between respondents in countries clouds the effect somewhat.  
Neither government regulation nor enforcement on the other hand has a significant effect. This 
probably is the element where our estimates depart most from prior work. The difference may be 
due to the limited variation between the countries studied. Comparing our sample with Kus’ (2010) 
Page 16 of 32
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ser
Manuscripts submitted to Socio Economic Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 17
estimations, indeed show the limited variation in regulation and government effectiveness. This 
may lead to an underexposure of the real effect. Testing the theory in a number of countries that 
better reflect the variation between countries worldwide could tackle the problem. If this 
interpretation is correct, however, it also means that above a certain level of regulation or 
enforcement the effect becomes negligible.  
 
The social capital and trust factors perform very well. Higher levels of institutional trust inhibit 
engagement in the informal sector. This negative effect of institutional trust on informal activities is 
in line with other theoretical approaches of tax evasion and informal activities, in particular with the 
so-called ‘slippery-slope framework’. It also confirms findings from experimental research in this 
tradition. 
Both the quantity of social relations and social trust have a positive effect on informal exchanges. 
More intensive social contacts and higher social trust make informal transactions more probable. 
Contradictory evidence for the social trust factor (Hammar and Jagers and Nordblom, 2009; 
D’Hernoncourt and Méon, 2012), apart from data and design flaws, may also be due to the lack of 
control for institutional trust, which affects social trust positively (Freitag, 2003). Overall, the effect 
of social relations seems to be most robust. The scarce existing evidence (Lindström, 2005; Annen, 
2013) points in the same direction, but was limited to the consumption of illegal liquor or to 
informal firms in a developing country. Our results suggest that the effect indeed is stable over 
different types of informal activities and economic contexts. 
 
There remain open questions regarding the causal status of the trust factors, however. For one thing, 
there may be a reversed effect, where strong prevalence of informality decreases people’s trust in 
public order institutions. Also, some might argue that there is a substitution or complementarity 
between social and institutional trust: transactions depend on trust of one kind or another 
(Gambetta, 1988). Both problems can only be solved in designs that tackle the causal order 
problem. Because experimental manipulability of trust is hard to achieve, the closest strategy to the 
one developed here probably are time series data.  
 
A point of concern remains the fact that it was impossible to construct a measure of particularized 
social trust. Some arguments support the idea that it is trust in peers and those one shares an identity 
with, for example in the same ethnic minority, that fuels informal exchange. Generalized social 
trust, as a construct that measures respondents’ trust in people overall, may capture a different 
reality. A large-scale dataset measuring particularized social trust is a suggestion for further 
research. 
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Future research should also tackle the problem of the considerable divergence between macro-
economic estimates of the informal sector, and direct self-reported measures of informal activities. 
For the sample of countries studied here, the correlation with country based estimates even was 
negative. If one really looks for a ‘credibility revolution’ in informal economy studies (Slemrod and 
Weber, 2012), the results between both groups of estimations should be taken into account. This 
might also solve the surprising fact that a smaller sample of Western European countries does show 
an effect of regulation on informal transactions.  
 
To sum up, how do our predictions survive the confrontation with the data? The limitations of the 
data taken into account, they support the hypotheses well. Provided more elaborate comparative 
data could be collected regarding informal activities, there is good hope that both the theory and its 
testing may become more refined. The present contribution certainly legitimizes the investment of 
resources in this kind of data. The feasibility for governments of an evidence based tackling of 
(negative externalities from) the informal sector, may only come closer this way. 
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Annexes 
 
TABLE 4 
HERE 
TABLE 5 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                
1
  Downloadable from http://ess.nsd.uib.no/; extensive information about the design and the quality of the data at 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ 
2
  Fixed-effects logistic regressions were estimated with SPSS. 
3
  Multilevel model estimates are provided by MLWin (Rasbash et al., 2009). 
4
  GLLAMM routines were estimated with the help of Stata. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of self-reported informal activities 
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Table 1: Overview of the hypotheses 
Nr. Hypothesis Hypothetical effect  
on informal transactions 
1 Regulation  
    a Direct regulation: 
The scope of formal regulatory control of 
the economy 
+ 
    b Tax burden 
The proportion of taxes in relation to 
national income 
+ 
2 State strength 
Effective enforcement and access to 
public order contract enforcement 
- 
3 Social relations 
The number and the frequency of social 
contacts 
+ 
4 Generalized social trust 
Trust in other people, regardless of 
whether they are in-group or out-group 
+ 
5 Institutional trust 
Trust in the formal institutions of the 
state 
- 
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Table 1: overview of the measurement of the hypotheses of the model 
Hypothesis / concept Source Measurement 
1. Regulatory burden 
a. Direct regulation (Kus, 2010; World Bank 
and International Bank 
for Reconstruction and 
Development, 2012); 
www.doingbusiness.org, 
downloaded 15/6/2012 
Mean of the z-scores of 12 indicators 
in the dimensions market entry, paying 
taxes, employment of workers and 
property registration 
a’  Direct 
regulation (alternative) 
(Wölfl et al., 2009)  
b. Tax burden (OECD, 2011) Tax revenue as % of GDP in 2005 
b’  Tax burden 
(alternative) 
OECD, doi: 10.1787/tax-
gds-serv-table-2013-1-
en 
Tax burden on goods and services 
2. State strength (Kaufmann et al., 2009; 
Kus, 2010) 
Composite indicator ‘rule of law’ in 
2005. 
2’.  State strength 
(alternative) 
(World Bank and 
International Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development, 2012); 
www.doingbusiness.org, 
downloaded 15/6/2012 
Enforcement of contracts (cost, % of 
claim) 
3. Social relations ESS 2005: sclmeet Frequency of meeting with people, 7 
point scale 
4. Social trust ESS 2005: ppltrst, 
pplfair, pplhlp 
Trust in people: mean score of at least 
2 out of 3 items, 11 point scale each. 
 Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted, 
or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people? 
 Do you think that most people 
would try to take advantage of you 
if they got the chance, or would 
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they try to be fair? 
 Would you say that most of the 
time people try to be helpful or 
that they are mostly looking out 
for themselves? 
Cronbach’s α = 0.771 
5. Institutional trust ESS 2005: trstprl, trstlgl, 
trstplc, trstplt, trstprt 
Mean score of at least 4 out of 5 items 
(11 point scale) of trust in parliament, 
legal system, police, politicians and 
political parties. 
Cronbach’s α = 0.877 
6. Control variables 
a. Age ESS 2005: agea Recoded into three categories: ≤ 20, 
21-60 and ≥ 61.  
Reference: 21-60 
b. Gender ESS 2005: gndr Reference: women 
c. Professional status ESS 2005: icempl, 
icmnac (coded by the 
interviewer) 
Recoded into three categories: non-
active, employee, self-employed or 
employed in the family business. 
Reference: non-active 
d. Educational level ESS 2005: eisced Recoded into 5 categories from ISCED  
Reference: lowest level (less than 
lower secondary education) 
Note: For purposes of transparency, variable names from variable 3 on are the same as depicted in 
the original and downloadable ESS data. 
Page 29 of 32
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ser
Manuscripts submitted to Socio Economic Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Table 3: Logistic regressions with fixed and random effects, binary and ordinal 
Variables Model 1: binary logistic function Model 2: ordinal logistic function 
Fixed effects MCMC PQL-2 GLLAMM Fixed-effects MCMC PQL-2 GLLAMM 
1. Regulatory burden         
a. Direct 
regulation 
 0.066  
(0.314) 
0.049  
(0.300) 
0.058  
(0.269) 
 0.010  
(0.323) 
-0.006  
(0.303) 
-0.001  
(0.270) 
b. Tax burden  0.035  
(0.019)
+
 
0.034  
(0.018)
+
 
0.033  
(0.014)* 
 0.037  
(0.021)
+
 
0.034  
(0.018)
+
 
0.033  
(0.014)* 
2. Rule of law  0.117  
(0.210) 
0.114  
(0.199) 
0.117  
(0.169) 
 0.066  
(0.214) 
0.078 
(0.201) 
0.068  
(0.167) 
3. Social relations 0.027  
(0.008)*** 
0.028  
(0.008)*** 
0.028  
(0.008)*** 
0.028  
(0.008)*** 
0.035  
(0.008)*** 
0.035 
(0.008)*** 
0.036  
(0.008)*** 
0.035  
(0.008)*** 
4. Social trust 0.023  
(0.007)** 
0.022  
(0.007)** 
0.022  
(0.007)** 
0.022  
(0.007)** 
0.020  
(0.007)** 
0.020  
(0.007)** 
0.020  
(0.007)** 
0.020  
(0.007)** 
5. Institutional trust -0.053  
(0.007)*** 
-0.053  
(0.007)*** 
-0.053  
(0.007)*** 
-0.053  
(0.007)*** 
-0.062  
(0.007)*** 
-0.061  
(0.007)*** 
-0.062  
(0.007)*** 
-0.061  
(0.007)*** 
Notes: Dependent variable model 1: paid cash to avoid VAT in the past 5 years (yes/no). Dependent variable model 2: frequency of cash payments to avoid VAT, 5-point 
scale. Significance: 
+
p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Country level observations: 26; individual level observations: 42,520. The 25 country dummies (in the fixed 
effects regression), the control variables (age, gender, professional status and educational level), the constant(s) and the random intercept variance are not reported in the 
table. MCMC: Markov chain Monte Carlo method, with a diffuse prior, a burn-in length of 50,000 iterations,  2,500,000 simulations and a thinning factor of 100. PQL-2: 
second order penalized quasi-likelihood estimates. GLLAMM: adaptive Gaussian quadrature with 24 quadrature points.  
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Table 4: Alternative specifications, models 3 (selection of 15 countries) and 4 (random intercept and slopes) 
Variables Model 3: selection of 15 countries Model 4: random 
intercept & slopes (MCMC) 
Fixed-effects MCMC PQL-2 GLLAMM  
1. Regulatory burden  
a. Direct regulation  0.986 (0.472)* 1.012 (0.421)* 1.003 (0.358)** -0.093 (0.266) 
b. Tax burden  0.043 (0.017)* 0.047 (0.017)** 0.046 (0.014)** 0.028 (0.017)
+
 
2. Rule of law  0.070 (0.312) 0.108 (0.296) 0.097 (0.252) 0.133 (0.175) 
3. Social relations 0.036 (0.011)** 0.037 (0.011)*** 0.037 (0.011)*** 0.037 (0.011)*** 0.028 (0.011)* 
4. Social trust 0.010 (0.010) 0.010 (0.010) 0.010 (0.010) 0.010 (0.010) 0.019 (0.010)
+
 
5. Institutional trust -0.049 (0.009)*** -0.048 (0.009)*** -0.049 (0.009)*** -0.048 
(0.009)*** 
-0.051 (0.009)*** 
Notes: Dependent variable: paid cash to avoid VAT in the past 5 years (yes/no). Significance: 
+
p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Country level observations: 15 (model 
3) and 26 (model 4); individual level observations: 24,690 (model 3) and 42,520 (model 4). The country dummies (in the fixed effects regression), the control variables (age, 
gender, professional status and educational level), the constant, the random intercept variance and the random slopes variances and covariances (in model 4) are not 
reported in the table. PQL-2: second order penalized quasi-likelihood estimates. MCMC: Markov chain Monte Carlo method, with a diffuse prior, a burn-in length of 50,000 
iterations,  2,500,000 simulations and a thinning factor of 100. GLLAMM: adaptive Gaussian quadrature with 24 quadrature points. 
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Table 5: Alternative country variables 
Variables Model 5: alternative country data 
MCMC PQL-2 GLLAMM 
1. Regulatory burden  
a' Product market regulation -0.047 (0.224) -0.048 (0.213) -0.043 (0.194) 
b' Tax burden on goods and services 0.070 (0.046) 0.071 (0.046) 0.070 (0.042)
+
 
2. Enforcement of contracts, cost -0.003 (0.014) -0.003 (0.013) -0.003 (0.012) 
3. Social relations 0.029 (0.008)*** 0.030 (0.008)*** 0.029 (0.008)*** 
4. Social trust 0.024 (0.007)*** 0.024 (0.007)*** 0.024 (0.007)*** 
5. Institutional trust -0.055 (0.007)*** -0.055 (0.007)*** -0.054 (0.007)*** 
Notes: Dependent variable: paid cash to avoid VAT in the past 5 years (yes/no). Significance: 
+
p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Country level observations: 25; 
individual level observations: 40,890. The control variables (age, gender, professional status and educational level), the constant and the random intercept variance are not 
reported in the table. PQL-2: second order penalized quasi-likelihood estimates. MCMC: Markov chain Monte Carlo method, with a diffuse prior, a burn-in length of 50,000 
iterations,  2,500,000 simulations and a thinning factor of 100. GLLAMM: adaptive Gaussian quadrature with 24 quadrature points. 
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